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The “Great War” and its “Comeback”
Against the backdrop of the 100th anniversary, Russia’s evident 
interest in the history of the years from 1914 to 1917/18 was 
often perceived as a revival of a long suppressed and unwanted 
commemoration. In 2014, Russia, it seemed, rediscovered World 
War One. A “war forgotten” was remembered in various exhibi-
tions, scientific and popular publications, illustrated books, TV-
documentary films, and even in the cinema. The way the Great 
War was exhibited, characterized, interpreted, and adapted for 
the screen in some cases more or less obviously corresponded to 
Russia’s present-day self-portrayal as “home of the brave.”  Those 
brave men and women dominated the filmic narratives of WWI 
in 2014, and the general public must have been convinced that 
Russian soldiers’ overwhelming patriotism and readiness to make 
sacrifices during WWI would result in a just and well-deserved 
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victory, unless their enemies and allies were more or less satanic 
combatants (especially the German Empire) and deceitful trai-
tors (France and Great Britain). According to this interpretation, 
Russia was abused by its allies and had to carry the major burden 
of the war. Obviously, an analogy between past and present was 
intended by the architects of a strong patriotism and a new pa-
triotic culture in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which was ostracized 
by the USA and the European Union since at least its proceeding 
in the Crimea and in the Ukraine. The message is clear: Russia 
stood alone during the First World War, cheated by its allies and 
beaten only because of a revolution that was supported by the 
Germans, and it stands alone now, misapprehended and wrongly 
stigmatized by the rest of the world, which, without plausible 
reason, considers itself morally and ethically superior to Russia. 
In 2014, on 1 August, when Putin inaugurated a monument to 
Russian soldiers of the First World War, he offered a “stab-in-the-
back explanation of Tsarist Russia’s defeat and collapse,” alluding 
“of course, to the Bolsheviks” who had been sent to Russia by the 
Germans.1 In doing this, the Russian President more or less adopt-
ed the perception of emigrated Tsarist officers who had interpreted 
the lost war as a “German-Bolshevik plot to destroy the nation.”2 In 
1 Many thanks to J.  Köstenberger and V. Denisov for their help regard-
ing investigations for this article in Moscow.
Transliteration of Russian follows Library of Congress transliteration table.
Cf. Vladimir Socor, “Putin Re-Interprets Russia´s Participation in the 
First World War,” in Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume 11, no. 143 (2008). ac-
cessed Jan. 25, 2016, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=42714&no_cache=1.
2  Aaron J. Cohen, “Oh, That! Myth, Memory, and World War I in the 
Russian Emigration and in the Soviet Union,” Slavic Review 62, no. 1 
(Spring 2003): 69–86, here: 74.
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any case, Putin spoke of “‘re-establishing the unbroken continuity 
of our history,’ incorporating the First World War’s ‘sacred memory’ 
into the official accounts of Russia´s history. […] Amid its ongoing 
war against Ukraine, the Kremlin is reaching into history to recu-
perate yet another militarist narrative for popular consumption.”3
There are many critical and stimulating analyses of Russia’s past 
and current commemorative culture and the official conception of 
history that was repeatedly modified even in the Soviet era.4 After 
1989 and the following fundamental changes that Eastern Europe, 
including the USSR, faced, a mere reversal of former interpre-
tations by communist doctrines in regard to the history before 
and after the Bolsheviks seized power was an evident temptation 
for those countries. In post-Soviet Russia, historiography ran 
through various phases of reorientation. Putin’s Russia obviously 
did not abandon communist interpretations of the past as a whole, 
in order to adapt them for its own purposes. As a result, Stalin, for 
example, remains the “father of the nation” who led Soviet people 
to a glorious victory against German barbarism between 1941 
and 1945. Historiography and the conception of history in today’s 
Russia are not free from contradictions. Still accepted communist 
interpretations of history and a reinterpretation of communist 
history as an antipode of former narratives are in juxtaposition 
with each other, but they somehow coexist. Moreover, popular 
interpretations of history introduce additional dimensions. But 
all of those variations that are initiated or accepted by official 
Russia, notwithstanding the lack of stringent reflections, share 
3  Ibid.
4  See for example: Lars Karl and Igor J. Polianski, eds., Geschichtspoli-
tik und Erinnerungskultur im neuen Russland (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 
2009); or Catherine Merridale, Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Twen-
tieth Century Russia (London: Granta, 2000).
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the same intended purpose: the strengthening of patriotism, 
completed by the advice to distrust the world beyond the bor-
ders of Russia.5
In regard to the appraisal of the role of the Tsarist army, recent 
Russian fiction and documentary films have made a distinct turn-
ing away from former communist perceptions. Nonetheless, there 
are some striking continuities to Soviet cinema as, for instance, 
the near complete absence of Austria-Hungary.
The Tsarist Empire and the War on the Screen
After 1945, the so-called “Habsburg myth” played an important 
role in the process of identity in the Second Austrian Republic. 
While World War One itself was largely neglected in cultural 
5  It has to be underlined that this text concentrates on the Russian offi-
cial narratives in films on the First World War. There are, of course a lot of 
“deviant” interpretations including, for example, differentiated approaches 
by historians. In this respect, it has to be mentioned that, in 2012, Kees 
Boterbloem has examined Russian historiography of the First World War 
in regard of the Russian participation. He saw a lack of Russian-language 
monographs on Russia in WWI and reasoned that this lack had “much to 
do with the continued unease felt in Russia about the Great War.” Boter-
bloem´s result obviously differs from recent interpretations of the First 
World War and Russia’s role by official Russia today. Cf. Kees Boterbloem, 
“‘Chto delat’?: World War I in Russian Historiography after Communism,” 
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25, no. 3 (2012), 393–408, accessed 
Feb. 1, 2016, DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2012.705655. On historiography of 
the Russian Revolution with an overview of current Russian interpreta-
tions of the Revolution see: S. A. Smith, “The Historiography of the Rus-
sian Revolution 100 Years on,” in Kritika 16, no. 4 (Fall 2015), 733–749.
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avenues, completely uncritical depictions of Habsburg history 
presented the Austro-Hungarian Empire as role model for a peace-
ful coexistence of different nations and Franz Joseph I as the “the 
good old Kaiser.” The Dual Monarchy was portrayed as an ideal 
state, and in regard of World War One, this “paradise” was only 
misled and abused by the Germans seeking world supremacy. 
After World War II, the Austrian people have become accustomed 
to such interpretations of the Habsburg past. They could not even 
imagine that Austria-Hungary was not seen in a similar way in 
other countries. Austrian feature films of the 1950s introduced 
soldiers of the “k.u.k.” army as clumsy and harmless guys or as 
smart womanizers. The First World War on the screen, all in all, 
was either completely absent or presented as if there had been 
neither misery nor bloodshed, but only “Waltz” and “Schmaltz.”6 
It was unthinkable that soldiers of the Habsburg army had com-
mitted war crimes.7 In addition, historiography for decades fo-
cused on Germany, claiming that the militant Kaiserreich bear the 
chief responsibility for the war that started in summer 1914. The 
Danube Monarchy was either exculpated or more or less ignored. 
Until now, some historians complain, Austria-Hungary is rather 
perceived as victim of German warmongers than as autonomous 
player.8 In fact, there was already a movement to marginalize the 
Habsburg monarchy during the war, concentrating on its lack of 
6  Sabine A. Haring, “Between the Topos of a ´Forgotten War´ and the 
Current Memory Boom: Remembering the First World War in Austria,” 
in Remembering the First World War, ed. Bart Ziino (London: Routledge, 
2015), 207–222, here: 214–216.
7  See for example: Karin Moser, ed., Besetzte Bilder: Film, Kultur und Pro-
paganda in Österreich 1945–1955 (Vienna: Verlag Filmarchiv Austria, 2005).
8  Lothar Höbelt, “Stehen oder Fallen?” Österreichische Politik im Ersten 
Weltkrieg (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2015), 131.
254 habsburg’s last war: the filmic memory (1918 to the present)
strength and its dependence on German economic and military 
support. The longer the war lasted, Entente powers tended to per-
ceive Austria-Hungary as a pure appendix of German authorities, as 
“junior partner” of the Kaiserreich, which made important decisions 
without asking the young Habsburg Emperor Karl. Nevertheless, 
for Tsarist Russia, the Danube monarchy was its main adversary. 
While in 1914 Germany’s main effort was concentrated against 
France, requiring approximately ninety percent of its manpower, 
Austria deployed the bulk of its forces against Russia.9
So, how did Tsarist cinematic propaganda portray the Danube 
monarchy, whose conflict with Serbia figured at the beginning of 
a European war that broadened to a world wide struggle? Whom 
did Russian cinema blame for the outbreak of the conflict that, 
in the end, swept away the Romanovs and their Empire? Who 
was deemed to be “worse” or more “condemnable”? The German 
Empire or the Danube monarchy? And was Russian film pro-
duction able to comply with the requirements of an effective 
propaganda?
The war seriously affected Russian cinema: “On the eve of the 
conflict nearly 90 percent of film productions shown in Russia 
had come from abroad.”10 Before the war, a large number of films 
distributed in Russia had been of German origin. After the out-
break of hostilities, French film companies in Russia especially 
9  Timothy C. Dowling, “Eastern Front,” in 1914–1918-online: Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. Ute Daniel et al. (Ber-
lin: Freie Universität Berlin 2014), DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15463/
ie1418.10316.
10  Alexandre Sumpf, “Film/Cinema (Russian Empire),” in 
1914–1918-online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. 
by Ute Daniel et al. (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2014), DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.15463/ie1418.10383.
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benefited.11 Besides, the Tsarist Empire saw a growing number of 
Russian companies and “the strengthening of national champions, 
as the Khanzhonkov, Drankov and Ermol[´]ev Studios.”12 Native 
film production increased rapidly. On the other hand, “it would 
be a mistake to underestimate the profound influence of Western 
European filmmaking had overall in Russian filmmakers and 
audiences.”13 German companies, however, were forced to shut 
down their production, and German theater owners and distribu-
tors were exiled. In 1915, all German films were banned.14
Tsarist propaganda identified Germany as a responsible aggres-
sor and as the most dangerous enemy, “the one against which the 
greatest patriotic efforts had to be directed.”15 Germans turned out 
to be the main target of people’s anger in Russian metropoles, and 
anti-German riots seemed to express the degree of hate toward the 
enemy, including the German minority in Russia.16 Spy mania was 
widespread already before the war and explosively increased during 
the July Crisis 1914. German speaking people, including Jews, were 
11  In 1914, ninety percentof the films distributes internationally in the 
world were French; Michael Wood, Film: A Very Short Introduction (Ox-
ford: University Press, 2012), 48
12  Sumpf, “Film/Cinema (Russian Empire).” On the Russian “Movie 
Moguls” see: Louise McReynolds, Russia at Play: Leisure Activities at the 
End of the Tsarist Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 269–276.
13  Denise J. Youngblood, The Magic Mirror: Moviemaking in Russia 
1908–1918 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press,1999), 13.
14  Hubertus F. Jahn, Patriotic Culture in Russia During World War I 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 152.
15  Jahn, Patriotic Culture,173. 
16  On the riots in Moscow of 26–29 May 1915 see: Eric Lohr, “Patriotic 
Violence and the State: The Moscow Riots of May 1915,” in Kritika 4, no. 3 
(Summer 2003), 607–626.
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considered the prime suspects by Tsarist counterintelligence, and 
“private citizens flooded government agencies with denunciations 
of suspected spies.”17 Recently, however, Russian historians have 
questioned if Germanophobia would have emerged that intensely 
without the massive efforts of propaganda especially in 1914–15.18 
Russian propaganda had to go all out to shape a convincing con-
cept of the enemy. Finally, “convincing” meant to present a primitive 
and distorted image. Germany and its “Kaiser” were demonized, 
and Wilhelm was portrayed as the “Antichrist.”19 In a feature film 
of the same title (Antichrist), the German Emperor acted like a real 
17  Jonathan W. Daly, “Security Services in Imperial and Soviet Rus-
sia,” in Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 4, no. 4 (Fall 
2003), 955–974, here: 969.
18  See respective deliberations in contributions of: Wladimir Fed-
juk, “Der Kampf gegen die ´deutsche Überfremdung´ in der russischen 
Provinz,” in Verführungen der Gewalt: Russen und Deutsche im Ersten und 
Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Karl Eimermacher and Astrid Volpert (Munich: 
Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2005), 95–119; Boris Kolonizkij, “Metamorpho-
sen der Germanophobie: Deutschland in den politischen Konflikten der 
Februarrevolution,” in Verführungen der Gewalt: Russen und Deutsche im 
Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Karl Eimermacher and Astrid Volpert 
(Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2005), 121–144; Dimitrij Olejnikow, “Von 
Ritterlichkeit zu Verachtung: Auswirkungen des Ersten Weltkriegs auf das 
Verhältnis zu den Deutschen,” in Verführungen der Gewalt: Russen und 
Deutsche im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Karl Eimermacher and As-
trid Volpert (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2005), 179–204.
19  Jekaterina Chochlowa, “Vom Dialog zu Konfrontation: Russischer 
und deutscher Film zwischen den Weltkriegen,” in Stürmische Aufbrüche 
und enttäuschte Hoffnungen: Russen und Deutsche in der Zwischenk-
riegszeit, ed. Karl Eimermacher and Astrid Volpert (Munich: Wilhelm 
Fink Verlag, 2006), 927–952, 930.
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monster, brutal and completely immoral.20 According to the belief 
of some Russian peasants, he was even drinking human blood.21 The 
film was very popular and became a tremendous box office hit, as an 
exhibitor from Moscow wrote in the Kine-zhurnal.22 Wilhelm was 
a “negative hero,” a character that united all what was considered 
to be evil. He was blamed to be responsible for the shocking attacks 
on Belgian civilians committed by his soldiers. In Liliia Bel´gii (The 
Lily of Belgium, 1915, directed by Ladislas Starevich), an animated 
film that is perceived as a masterpiece of early Russian cinematog-
raphy, German soldiers figured as “barbaric Huns” who “raped” 
Belgium.23 The film journal Ėkran Rossii called the film an “allegory” 
of Belgium´s “suffering.”24 Far from “allegory,” however, was the plot 
of Dykhanie antikhristov (The breath of the antichrists), which was 
released in 1915 by the company G.I. Libken. In this film, German 
soldiers are not only killing Russian prisoners of war, but also raping 
women, beating children, and burning down peaceful villages. The 
journal Sine-fono predicted a huge success of Dychanie antichristov.25   
“War terror films played extensively on the audience’s fascina-
tion with the unknown and therefore dangerous aspects of the 
20  Jahn, Patriotic Culture, 166.
21  Sine-fono, no. 13 (April 25, 1915), 90.
22  Sine-fono, no. 14-15 (May 23, 1915), 78–79.
23  Sumpf, “Film/Cinema (Russian Empire).” 
24  Ekran Rossii, no. 1 (1916), 20.
25  Sine-fono, no. 19-20 (Aug. 22, 1915), 66. See also pictures from the 
film in: Vestnik Kinematografii, no. 114 (1915), 15–16, 32, 51, 53. There 
was a Russian film—perhaps—Dychanie antichristov that showed German 
nurses, searching through the battlefields and stabbing Russian wounded 
soldiers; Arthur Ponsonby, Absichtliche Lügen in Kriegszeiten: Eine Aus-
wahl von Lügen, die während des Ersten Weltkrieges in allen Völkern verb-
reitet wurden (Seeheim: Buchkreis, 1967), 135. 
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war. The psychological function was clearly more important than 
the historical authenticity of the episodes. In this respect, it should 
be noted that ‘German horrors’ were already being advertised in a 
film produced at the very outbreak of the war, before any atrocities 
had been reported.”26 It has to be noted that the Russian audience, 
seemingly already before the war, preferred more dramatic and 
morbid films than the Western moviegoers: Russia’s movie studios 
had “manufactured dreams that audiences in other cultures would 
have considered nightmares.”27 Obviously, people found “unhappy 
endings” more consolatory than “happy endings” that were far from 
real life.28 This, perhaps, helps to understand why in 1916 a film 
with the depressing title The Poor Chap Died in an Army Hospital 
was one of the most viewed picture in wartime Russia.29
26  Jahn, Patriotic Culture, 166. “All the belligerents in World War One 
employed atrocity propaganda associated with the enemy and, as a result, 
stereotypes emerged that had been largely developed in the period leading 
up to the outbreak of war. The recognition of stereotypes is an important 
part of understanding the use of anti-symbols and the portrayal of the 
enemy in propaganda”; David Welch, “Depicting the enemy,” British Li-
brary, accessed Feb. 2, 2016, http://www.bl.uk/world-war-one/articles/de-
picting-the-enemy. See also: David Welch and Jo Fox, eds., Justifying War: 
Propaganda, Politics and the Modern Age (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2012).
27  McReynolds, Russia at Play, 290. See also: 276.
28  See also: Richard Stites, Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment 
and Society Since 1900 (Cambridge: University Press, 1992), 33–34. With 
explanations for the Russian type of “melodrama”: Schamma Schaha-
dat, “Leidenschaft und Ökonomie: Das russische Stummfilm-Melodrama 
zwischen Fin de Siècle und Moderne,” arcadia: International Journal of 
Literary Culture 44, no. 1 (Jan. 2009): 137–186, here: 160 and 140–142.
29  Sumpf, “Film/Cinema (Russian Empire).”
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“Fear and horror” attracted an audience that wanted to learn 
what the enemy was like. German war crimes flourished in all 
Russian arts. Some popular Russian feature films interestingly 
mainly focused on violence committed on the French front rather 
than on the situation in Galicia, East-Prussia, or Armenia.30 But, 
by only skimming over the pages of Russian film journals,31 one 
will realize that there are some feature films, like the above men-
tioned Dykhanie antikhristov and various documentary films, that 
dealt with atrocities on the Russian Western Front. The latter were 
shown in various newsreels (kinokhronika), produced, for exam-
ple, by the Skobelev Committee, which, in 1914, “had obtained 
exclusive rights from the emperor to film on the front lines, to 
raise funds for soldiers wounded in combat with the sale of the 
footage.”32 The Skobelev Committee, however, was ill-equipped 
and underfunded. Less than a dozen cameramen tried to get 
pictures of military operations and life at the front lines. Hence, 
historians claim, the Skobelev Committee was not able to provide 
a visual record of the war on the Russian Western Front and that, 
consequently, Russian moviegoers learned more about what was 
30  Ibid. and Alexandre Sumpf, “In Szene gesetzt: Der Erste Weltkrieg 
im russischen und sowjetischen Kino,” Osteuropa 64, no. 2–4 (Februar–
April 2014): 339–350, here: 340; Kine-zhurnal, no. 19-20 (Oct. 18, 1914).  
31  On Russian film journals see for example: Natascha Drubek, Rus-
sisches Licht: Von der Ikone zum frühen sowjetischen Film (Vienna: Böhlau, 
2012), 117.
32 Sumpf, “Film/Cinema (Russian Empire).” On the history of the film 
department of the Skobelev-Committee see also: G. E. Malysheva, “K is-
torii kinematograficheskoi dejatel´nosti Sokobelevskogo komiteta 1913-
1914 gg. Opyt i metodiki issledovatel´skoi raboty spetsialistov Rossiiskogo 
gosaudarstevennogo archiva kinodokumentov (RGAKFD),” in Vestnik ar-
chivista, no. 1 (2012): 3–17.
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going on at the theaters of War of their allies.33 Undoubtedly, foot-
ages delivered by France or Great Britain outnumbered Russian 
newsreels to give an impression of the war. But, obviously, at least 
in 1914–15, Russian feature as well as documentary films on war 
crimes committed by the enemies did not completely omit the 
Western Front. After all, to show enemy barbarity on the screen 
was a matching part to press propaganda, where news about cru-
elties of the adversary had become ubiquitous.34
Violence against Tsarist prisoners of war in Austria-Hungary 
was picked up by Russian propaganda, which published various 
pamphlets or reports of soldiers who succeeded in escaping. It 
is not amazing, that atrocities committed by Austrian-Hungarian 
soldiers did also reach the screen.35 Only few weeks after the 
outbreak of war the Kine-zhurnal announced the release of the 
feature film Tsivilizovannye varvary (Civilized barbarians), where 
Austrian soldiers arrested a defenseless young woman and only at 
the last moment were restrained from shooting an old man who 
was suspected to be a spy. Interestingly, at the end of the descrip-
tion of the film in the Kine-zhurnal, the old man is dooming the 
33  Peter Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, 1917–1953 (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press,1992), 22.
34  Cf. Laurent Véray, “Cinema,” in The Cambridge History of the First 
World War, vol. 3, Civil Society, ed. Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 475–503, here: 492. See also: World War I and 
Propaganda, ed. Troy R.E. Paddock (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 1.
35  On atrocities committed by Austro-Hungarian soldiers and the “im-
age” of them among Russians see: Elena S. Senjavskaja, “Die Völker Öster-
reich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg aus der Sicht des russischen Gegners,” 
in Jenseits des Schützengrabens: Der Erste Weltkrieg im Osten. Erfahrung 
– Wahrnehmung – Kontext, ed. Bernhard Bachinger and Wolfram Dornik 
(Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2013), 325–340. 
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“German hangmen” (“palacham-nemtsam”) and not the Austrian 
ones.36 Another movie, which was also produced by the company 
of A. O. Drankov, is described in the same issue of the mentioned 
zhurnal and deals with the very first period of the war, too: Za tsar-
ja i otechestvo ili liudi-brat´ia (For Tsar and fatherland). It shows 
the situation at the frontier to Austria-Hungary shortly after the 
hostilities had started. The Austrians are brutal, but they act cow-
ardly, unsuccessfully trying to incite the different nations against 
the Russians: “Russians, Jews, Georgians, Ingush: all are fighting 
to save the home country.”37 Generally, the Austrian brutes are 
of German or Polish origin. Concentrating on those nations, the 
propaganda corresponded with existent animosity and distrust. 
It was plausible that the scene of anti-Austrian feature films was 
mainly situated in the neighboring Austrian crownland Galicia, 
with its multifaceted ethnic conflicts.
Due to Germany’s part as the aggressor to blame the most for 
the outbreak of war it makes sense that Russian wartime feature 
films mostly focused on Germany and the Germans, who were 
transgressing “all moral and religious bounds.”38 On the other 
hand, there are no studies on Russian film production in wartime 
that are trying to find out if there were significant differences in 
presenting either the German or the Austrian or the German-
Austrian (German speaking Austrians/Deutschösterreicher) 
enemies on the screen. A first and rough analysis of Russian 
wartime feature films, based on Russian film journals published 
between 1914 and 1917 and filmographies for this period, sup-
ports the assumption that patriotic feature films dealing with 
“anti-German plots” predominate. But is has to be stated that the 
36  Kine-zhurnal, no. 15-16 (Aug. 23, 1914): 33.
37  Ibid.
38  Jahn, Patriotic Culture, 165. 
262 habsburg’s last war: the filmic memory (1918 to the present)
“German preponderance” in comparison with Austria-Hungary’s 
presence is less striking than supposed—at least at the begin-
ning of war.39 
Tsarist filmic propaganda used traditional stereotypes of the 
enemy states and intensified and even exaggerated them to the 
point of a burlesque: “As in other warring nations, enemy leaders 
became convenient personifications and focal points of broader 
sets of clichés. […] Images of a weak and crumbling empire, ex-
pressing imperial rivalry with Austria, were projected onto the 
figure of the old and frail Franz Joseph.”40 But did the Habsburg 
monarchy, which was considered to be weak and damned to 
crumble, appear to be less dangerous than the “German huns”? 
And did Russian cinema portray Franz Joseph in a similar way as 
it did German Kaiser Wilhelm? 
In 1916, when the Kine-zhurnal indicated that there were about 
4,000 motion picture theaters in Russia, with two million mov-
iegoers a day,41 a film about the tragedy of the Austrian crown 
prince Rudolf and his concubine Mary Vetsera was advertised.42 
Mariia Vechera, produced by the company Drankov, was obvi-
ously released already in the year before and announced as film 
39  See for instance: Velikii kinemo: Katalog sokhranivshikhsia igrovykh 
fil´mov Rossii 1908–1919 (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2002); 
V. Vishnevskii, Dokumental´nye fil´my dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii 1907–1916 
gg. (Moscow, 1996); Ven. Vishnevskii, Khudozhestvennye fil´my dorev-
oliutsionnoi Rossii (Filmograficheskoe opisanie) (Moscow: Goskinoizdat, 
1945); S. S. Ginzburg, Kinematografiia dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii (Moscow, 
1963); Sovetskie khudozhestvennye fil´my: Annotirovannyi katalog (Mos-
cow: Iskusstvo, 1961).
40  Jahn, Patriotic Culture, 173. 
41  Kine-zhurnal, no.15-18 (1916): 82.
42  Kine-zhurnal, no. 19-20 (1916): 104.
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about a “secret affair in the live of a foreign court.”43 In this pic-
ture, retelling the history of the unhappy son of Emperor Franz 
Joseph who killed his concubine and then committed suicide, the 
audience is confronted with an abstruse version of the tragedy: 
the pregnant Mary Vetsera and her blue-blooded lover Rudolf 
are shot by officers who were instructed by Franz Joseph to ar-
rest Rudolf ’s concubine. The death of the old monarch’s only son 
buries the hopes of a whole Empire. Franz Joseph and Empress 
Elisabeth figure as broken parents. One can suppose that there is 
some sort of compassion toward the aged “Kaiser,” who had lost 
his son under such tragic circumstances.44 
In 1932, the magazine Proletarskoe kino analyzed Russian war-
time propaganda and asserted that the Germans had been por-
trayed as barbarians, whereas the Austrians had been described as 
cowards and scoundrels.45 As I have already shown in connection 
with Russian film productions shortly after the outbreak of war, 
there are some examples that illustrate that Austrians were consid-
ered to be cruel and merciless as well, notwithstanding portraying 
Franz Joseph as an old and broken-hearted man. In fact, there was 
no need for Russian propaganda to present the Austrian enemies 
as less damnable than the German ones. Above all, the oppression 
of Russia’s “Slavonic brothers” by Habsburg authorities served as a 
drastic example of the wickedness of the neighbor. This, for example, 
correlated with a film that was released in 1916 and advertised by the 
company Gomon as “vigorous drama.” V okovakh  Avstrii (In Austria’s 
chains) follows the experience of young Anton, living in Galicia. An 
Austrian named Prokop wants to get rid of him because he desires 
43  Kine-zhurnal, no. 13-14 (1915): 116.
44  Kine-zhurnal, no. 19-20 (1916): 112–113.
45  V. Sorokin, “Kino in vojna,” in Proletarskoe kino, no. 9 (1931): 48–53, 
here: 50.
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Anton´s girlfriend, Praskeda. Because of Prokop’s influence, Anton 
is enlisted by the Austrian army. Now Anton is full of hatred against 
Austria-Hungary. He decides to desert and fight against the Habsburg 
monarchy.46 Finally, he is arrested by Austrian authorities and sen-
tenced to death. His lady lover Prakseda goes mad and is killed by 
Anton’s uncle to “save” her from Austrian cruelties. The advertising 
pictures in Kine-zhurnal show a Russian soldier (probably Anton) 
who is executed by Austro-Hungarian soldiers.47 
Austrian brutality is also the main subject in a feature film 
on Czechs who had acquired Russian citizenship and united in 
a “legion of victory or death.” The film, titled Druzhina pobedy 
ili smerti, showed the tragic fate of “Czech heroes” who fought 
against Austrian oppressors and had to face the death penalty 
when being caught by the Austrians. In fact, “some 10 per cent 
of Czech prisoners volunteered” for the Czechoslovak Legion in 
Russia.48 The film Druzhina pobedy ili smerti was announced as an 
impressive example for the struggle between Slavs and Germans.49 
Furthermore, Slava nam – smert´ vragam (Glory to us, death to 
the enemy), a film directed by Evgenjj Bauer and produced by A. 
Khanzhonkov, showed that heroism could overcome apparently 
invincible enemies: Disguised as an Austrian nurse, the heroine 
of this film stabs a love-crazed Austro-Hungarian officer to get 
an important secret message. In the end, she is decorated with 
military honors, after having handed over the secret documents 
to Russian troops.50 However, Slava nam – smert´ vragam did not 
46  Sine-Fono, no. 6-7 (Jan. 10, 1915): 67.
47  Kine-zurnal, no. 21-22 (Nov. 1916): 76 and 131.
48  Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Eu-
rope, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923 (London: Routledge, 2001), 148. 
49  Sine-fono. no. 1-2 (Oct. 18, 1914): 38.
50  Stites, Russian popular culture, 35.
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reveal “before the audience … ‘scandalous and blatant horrors’,” 
with the exception of “almost colorless, grey episodes in which 
the nightmare of reality appears so clearly.”51   
Whereas the treason of former Austrian citizens was interpreted 
as a heroic act, espionage was either damned or appreciated, de-
pending on the question who was spying and for whom: “Espionage 
and treason fitted nicely into a wave of detective novels and films 
that swept over the Western world and Russia alike.” 52 Many of 
these films merely adapted the war to an established taste, but some 
contained more or less elaborate patriotic messages. In fact, there 
were a lot of spy films that focused on German espionage in par-
ticular.53 The writer and son of Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaia, 
Konstantin Breshko-Breshkovskii, succeeded as the author of some 
of those spy films, where male and female spies were trying to ob-
tain secrets about Russian warfare. Breshko-Breshkovskii appeared 
as a screenplay writer for a film, titled Grafinia-shpionka (avstri-
jskaia avantiura). The film was released only few days before the 
war broke out, and unlike the majority of spy films, concentrated on 
espionage of Austrian and not German provenience.54 
Spy films perfectly suited to a popular taste that, from the very 
beginning of the war, preferred plain entertainment and “the usual 
fare that had been popular before the war.”55 Feature films with war 
themes “were the crude and sensationalist fruits of savage com-
petition among film companies. Superlatives of terror, baseness, 
51  Cit. Silent Witnesses. Russian Films 1908-1919/Testimoni silenziosi. 
Filmi russi 1908–1919, ed. Paolo Cheerchi Usai et al. (Pordenone: Edizione 
Biblioteca dell´Immagine/British Film Institute, 1989), 236.
52  Jahn, Patriotic Culture, 163.
53  See: Proektor, no. 11-12 (June 15, 1916): 8.
54  Kine-zhurnal, no. 15-16 (Aug. 23, 1914): 10–11.
55  Jahn, Patriotic Culture, 154.
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brutality, and schmaltz advertised artistically weak and overhast-
ily lubok farces, patriotic spy and detective movies, nationalist 
love affairs and melodramas, and thrilling and apocalyptic ‘terror 
films.’”56 
While, in 1915, the Skobelev committee praised itself for a 
realistic depiction of war in its documentary films,57 escapism in-
creased as the war dragged on.58 The retreat of the Russian army as 
a result of Austro-German victories in 1915 left its marks on the 
Russians. It was perceived as a disastrous and disgraceful defeat, 
destroying the vision of a glorious victory. Patriotism “became 
more differentiated, simultaneously reflecting separate and even 
disparate loyalties within society.”59 This development as a mat-
ter of course affected Russian film production, too. According 
to Denise J. Youngblood from “1 August 1914 to the end of the 
year, nearly half of films made (50 to 103) concerned the war, but 
in 1916 the figure was only 13 titles out of a total of 500. This 
startling fact reflects in large part the extreme disaffection of the 
public from the government and the war effort—as well as the 
56  Ibid., 168.
57  Sumpf, “In Szene gesetzt,” 339–343; Ekran Rossii, no. 1 (1916): 23. 
On the problem of “authenticity” see also: David Williams, Media, Mem-
ory, and the First World War (Montreal: McGill-Queen´s University Press, 
2009), 110; Horst Tonn, “Der Erste Weltkrieg im amerikanischen Film,” in 
Der Erste Weltkrieg in der populären Erinnerungskultur, ed. Barbara Korte, 
Sylvia Paletschek, and Wolfgang Hochbruck (Essen: Klartext, 2008), 169–
180.
58  The fact that Russian movie-goers preferred plain entertainment 
interested also Soviet “experts” for cinema. See for example: K. Shutko, 
“Imperialisticheskaia voina i dorevoliucionnoe kino. Obzor kinozhurnalov 
1915–1917,” in Sovetskoe kino, no. 8 (September 1934): 31–34.    
59  Jahn, Patriotic Culture, 171.
267verena moritz :  traces of austr ia-hungary and the f irst  world war
government’s inability to organise cinematic propaganda.”60 Peter 
Kenez comes to similar conclusions, considering the absence of 
a centralized propaganda institution: “The outbreak of the war 
made a difference in the character of the Russian feature film not 
as result of the purposeful intervention of the government, but 
because the filmmakers shared the momentary enthusiasm for 
war, and because they believed that their audiences would pay to 
see patriotic films.”61 But, as soon as the enthusiasm faded, and it 
became clear that the war was not going to become a short and 
glorious combat, Russian film production turned to more prom-
ising genres.
In the period between the two Revolutions of 1917 not only the 
Skobelev committee was preoccupied with its reorganization;62 
the whole film and cinema business was seeking re-orientation: 
“Ideology entered Russian cinema with the Fall of the Romanov 
dynasty in February 1917. A brief look at titles of some of the 
films released in that year is sufficient to grasp the anti-monar-
chist and radical public mood: Dark Forces: Grigorii Rasputin and 
his Associates; In the Clutches of Judas; Governmental Deception; 
The Revolutionary, The Bourgeois, Enemy of the People.”63 The Kine-
zhurnal in June 1917, for instance, announced the production 
60  Denise Youngblood, “A War Forgotten: The Great War in Russian 
and Soviet Cinema,” in The First World War and Popular Cinema, ed. Mi-
chael Paris (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2000), 172–
181,173; Denise Youngblood, Russian War Films: On the Cinema Front, 
1914–2005 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 14.
61  Peter Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, 18.
62  Kine-zhurnal, no. 5-6 (1917): 22 and 23; Richard Taylor, The Politics of The 
Soviet Cinema 1917–1929 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 21.
63  David C. Gillespie, Russian Cinema (Edinburgh: Longman Publish-
ing Group, 2003), 103.
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about the last Tsar and his “bloody reign.”64 However, 1917 was 
more a caesura for film producers than for the audience itself, 
who still preferred entertainment films.65
There was a noticeable uncertainty in regard to the future of 
Russian film production. By the end of 1917, rumors about 
Bolshevik plans to nationalize Russian cinematography alarmed, 
as the Kine-zhurnal stated, everyone who was in some way in-
volved in the production or distribution of movies.66 Starting 
in May 1918, the Bolshevik newsreel Kino-Nedelja from time to 
time recalled the World War by showing “remains” of the conflict: 
for example, German and Austro-Hungarian POWs departing 
or homecoming Russian POWs.67 After the October Revolution, 
the exodus of film companies started. Nonetheless, the box office 
results in 1917 “broke previous records” and improved “by 33 
percent 1916, which was itself also a banner year.”68
64  Kine-zhurnal, no. 5-6 (March 30, 1917): 24–25.
65  Taylor, The Politics of The Soviet Cinema, 15–25.
66  Kine-zhurnal, no. 17-24 (1917): 48.
67  The “Austrian Film Museum” has published its flagship online video 
project: “Kino-nedelja - Online Edition.” 14 of the original 43 issues of the 
early Soviet newsreel series “Kino-nedelja” (Kino-Week) survived in the 
Austrian Film Museum’s collection. The newsreels, which date from the 
years 1918 and 1919, are not merely significant for their depiction of life in 
the young Soviet Russia during the civil war, but also because they repre-
sent Dziga Vertov’s first contribution to cinema. See: Filmmuseum, accessed 
March 12, 2016, https://www.filmmuseum.at/sammlungen/special_collec-
tions/sammlung_dziga_vertov/kinonedelja_online_edition.
68  Denise J. Youngblood, The Magic Mirror, 14.
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The Interwar Period
After 1918–19, the collapsed Russian film industry was reborn 
as Bolshevik cinema. The production of films on revolution-
ary topics replaced those on usual war themes that anyway 
had reached only a decreasing audience since 1915. Denise 
Youngblood, Karen Petrone, and Alexandre Sumpf, in their 
studies on Russian and Soviet Commemoration of World War 
One, have also examined the role the Great War played in Soviet 
interwar film productions.69 Sumpf, for instance, refers to Soviet 
montage films like Esfir Shub’s The Fall of the Romanov Dynasty 
(1927) or Evgenii Iakushin´s The World War (1929).70 Significantly, 
in The Fall of the Romanov Dynasty, the assassination of Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand was not even mentioned, while concentrating es-
pecially on the social consequences of the conflict.71 According to 
Sovetskii Ėkran, the enemies of Russia in “The World War” simply 
appeared as “imperialists.” The audience, however, was confront-
ed with an elephant from a “German zoo” who had to replace a 
railroad engine.72 
Denise Youngblood emphasizes “the extremely tangential role 
the Great War played” in revolutionary films like, for example, 
Eisenstein´s famous October (1928). She stresses that many of 
the revolutionary films included only some references to World 
War One, “but by no stretch could they be labelled ‘war films’ in 
69  For comparison see for instance: Claudia Sternberg, “Der Erin-
nerungsdiskurs im Spielfilm und Fernsehspiel,” in Der Erste Weltkrieg und 
die Mediendiskurse der Erinnerung in Großbritannien, ed. Barbara Korte, 
Ralf Schneider, and Claudia Sternberg (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neu-
mann, 2005), 243–342.
70  Sumpf, “Film/Cinema (Russian Empire).”
71  Ibid. 
72  Sovetskij Ekran, no. 30 (July 30, 1929): 4.
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the sense that European and American directors were making 
films about the world war that focused on the trials of soldiers 
at the front and in the trenches.”73 The only important Soviet 
film of the 1920s “in which Word War One battle time occu-
pies significant screen time” is, as Youngblood states, Aleksandr 
Dovshenko’s film Arsenal (1929).74 In regard to productions of 
the 1930s that were dealing with the war, she concentrates on an 
analysis of Boris Barnet´s Okraina (1932).75 Aleksandre Sumpf, 
beyond Okraina and Arsenal, quotes other Soviet interwar fea-
ture films “wholly or partially about the Great War.” Among 
those are: Comrade Abram (1919), Enemies (1924), Women of 
R´iazan (1929), God of War (1929), Her Way (1929), Merchants 
of Glory (1929), Cities and Years (1930), Doomed (1930), Sniper 
(1931), Quiet Flows the Don (1931), Three Soldiers (1932), and 
The First Platoon (1933) .76 
Karen Petrone is convinced that “World War I memory was an 
integral part of Soviet culture in the 1920s, even if the war was 
often viewed as mere prelude to the Revolution.”77 The fact that, 
between 1919 and 1933, the Soviet film industry produced at least 
73  Youngblood, A War Forgotten, 175.
74  Ibid., 176.
75  The title is translated by Youngblood as “Borderlands” and by Sumpf 
as “Outskirts.”
76  Sumpf, “Film/Cinema (Russian Empire).” 2014, some of these films 
were shown in the course of a scientific conference in Moscow that was 
dedicated to the commemoration of the First World War in Russian/So-
viet movies. See: “Первая мировая война в зеркале кинематографа,” 
tvkultura.ru, accessed Aug. 3, 2015, http://tvkultura.ru/article/show/arti-
cle_id/120085. 
77  Karen Petrone, The Great War in Russian Memory (Indianapolis: In-
diana University Press, 2011), 243.
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twenty-one fictional and documentary films78 is an endorsement 
of Petrone’s assessment in this regard.
It is obvious that the majority of those Soviet films quoted above 
were produced at the same time, when films like Westfront 1918. 
Vier von der Infanterie (1930, directed by G.W. Pabst) or above all 
the American film adaptation of Erich Maria Remarque’s novel, 
All Quiet at the Western Front (1930),79 excited and provoked the 
audiences in Europe. 
Again, there is the question of whether there are any traces of 
Austria-Hungary’s participation in the war in Soviet films on the 
First World War of this period. Not surprisingly, neither Sumpf and 
Youngblood nor Petrone are interested in identifying the “enemy” 
in the respective productions either as Germans or as Austrians/
Hungarians. They, more or less, “silently” accept that Soviet films 
concentrated on the Germans, often portrayed as proletarian 
comrades, abused by imperialism and nationalism and eventually 
“enlightened” and purified by experiencing communist solidarity. 
Obviously, only in Te, kotorye prozreli (Those who were enlightened, 
1930) is the audience confronted with soldiers from the Habsburg 
monarchy. According to a short plot description, the film deals 
with the events on the Western front in March 1917, ending in 
friendship between Russian and Hungarian soldiers. The film, 
78  In his article on war disabled on the screen Sumpf refers to the “pro-
duction of at least 21 Soviet fictional and documentary films” between 
1919 and 1933; Alexandre Sumpf, “War Disabled on Screen: Remember-
ing and Forgetting the Great War in the Russian and Soviet Cinema, 1914–
1940,” in First World War Studies 6, no. 1 (2015): 57–59, here: 58, DOI: 
10.1080/19475020.2015.1047889.
79  Verena Moritz, “Krieg,” in Kampfzone Kino: Film in Österreich 1918–
1938, ed., Verena Moritz, Karin Moser, and Hannes Leidinger (Vienna: 
Filmarchiv Austria, 2008), 255–276, here: 265–269.
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with its alternative titles Janosh vernëtsja domoj or Janosh priedet 
zaftra (Janosh is coming home [tomorrow]) is, it seems, a more 
than rare example of the Danube monarchy’s “life after death” in 
Soviet interwar film productions.80  
In sum, in many Soviet films on the First World War, there 
is, as A.M. Belogor´ev points out, an absence of “the enemy.” 
81 Cinema was not able to make comprehensible what World 
War One was about. The First World War more and more be-
came “an ahistorical symbol of imperialist” and, finally, “fascist, 
war.”82 Nevertheless, the “imperialists” are Germans rather than 
Austrians, and in regard to “fascists,” the connotation is obvious. 
Moreover, it has to be taken into account that due to Germany’s 
role concerning Lenin’s return to Russia and its intransigence 
in regard to the peace negotiations, the anti-German climate 
80  Repertuarnyi ukazatel´ dejstviiushchego fonda kinokartin: 1. Spisok 
khudozhestvennykh kinokartin na 1 marta 1940 g., (Moscow: Goskinoizdat, 
1940), 58; Repertuarnyi ukazatel´: Kinorepertuar. Pod redakciei P. A. Bljachana. 
Sostaviteli: A. I. Kacigras i A.S. Rozhdestvennskii (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe 
izdatel´stvo khudozhestvennoj literatury, 1934), 90; and a description in: “Те, 
которые прозрели,” my-hit.org, accessed Jan. 2, 2016, https://my-hit.org/
film/400411/; “Те, которые прозрели,” kino-teatr.ru, accessed Nov. 26, 2015, 
http://www.kino-teatr.ru/kino/movie/sov/13701/annot/print/.
81  A. M. Belogor´ev, “Pervaia mirovaia voina v zerkale otechestvenno-
go kinematografa,” in Istoricheskaia Ekspertiza, no. 1-2 (2015): 143–157, 
here: 153.
82  Aaron J. Cohen, “Oh, That! Myth, Memory, and World War I in the 
Russian Emigration and in the Soviet Union,” in Slavic Review 62, no. 1 
(Spring 2003): 69–86, here: 79. See also: Aaron Cohen, “Commemoration, 
Cult of the Fallen (Russian Empire),” in 1914-1918-online: International 
Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. Ute Daniel et al. (Berlin: Freie 
Universität Berlin, 2014), DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15463/ie1418.10421.
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in revolutionary Russia even increased, whereas the Habsburg 
monarchy appeared as a more or less moderate contingent that 
was ready to accept compromises. This perception continued 
to exist and, as a result, dominated Soviet Russia’s attitude to-
wards “Germans and Austrians,” too. Furthermore, the filmic 
concentration on the Germans as adversaries in the conflict 
shown corresponded to the Bolsheviks’ constant interest in 
German politics and developments, while the Habsburg Empire 
had ceased to exist and the Austrians had turned into citizens 
of a small and weak state in the heart of Europe. Germany still 
played an important role in European politics and in Moscow’s 
plannings; Austria and its mediocre Communist Party were only 
third-rate.83 It did not match with Bosheviks’ “didactic” under-
standing of cinema to restore to life a “dead enemy,” instead of 
dealing with an existing danger.84 Based on the films seen by 
the authoress of this article and due to the characterization of 
the films in Soviet journals, there can be no doubt that Austria-
Hungary in Soviet interwar feature films with references to the 
First World War has either completely vanished or left only 
vague traces. Furthermore, the remembrance of the First World 
War in general began to fade and then disappeared. Films that 
picked up the issue of World War One were considered to be 
behind the times and therefore needless. 
Already at the end of the 1920s, the Communist Party attempted 
“to bring political order to Soviet cinema and direct it along a secure 
ideological path.” Film productions had to answer Communist 
demands in regard to an adequate entertainment of the masses: 
83  On the interwar relations between the Soviet Union and Austria see: 
Verena Moritz et al., Gegenwelten: Die österreichisch-sowjetischen Bezie-
hungen 1918–1939 (St. Pölten: Residenzverlag, 2013).
84  Youngblood, A War Forgotten, 185.
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“Acknowledging the public’s love of action, adventure and comedy, 
which they had become accustomed to through popular Soviet 
films and imported American and European films, it was stressed 
that movies should provide communist enlightenment, but in 
a form ‘intelligible to the millions.’”85 Finally, the Kremlin more 
and more insistently wanted cinematography to respond to the 
demands of the armed forces and defense, too. Since 1926/1927, 
the fear of imminent military attack strongly influenced Soviet 
perception of the world.  Against this backdrop, Soviet authori-
ties claimed the production of military feature films preparing 
the audience for a defensive warfare.86 Cinematography abroad, 
asserted the journal Sovetskiy Ėkran had already begun its “war” 
against the USSR.87 In 1930, in the journal Kino i zhizn´ (Cinema 
and life), there were complaints about the passiveness of Soviet 
cinema in regard of themes like “the defense of our country.”88 
Soviet cinema had to become one of the strongest organizers 
of the Red Army’s future victory.89 Facing the threat of a future 
85  Jamie Miller, Soviet Cinema: Politics and Persuasion under Stalin 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 16.
86  M. Korol´, “Voennokhudozhestvennaia kinoproduktsiia,” in Pro-
letarskoe kino, no. 4 (April 1932): 35–42, here: 35; “Privet pervomu vse-
soiuznomu soveshchaniiu rabotnikov voennooboronnoi kinemtografii: 
Vnimanie oborone - na pervoe mesto,” in Proletarskoe kino, no. 8 (1932), 
1–10; Mikhail Korokhin, Oborona SSSR i kino. Zametki o kino kak orudii 
proletariata v voine budushchego (Moskva, 1930).
87  “Kak vooruzhaiut kinematografiiu protiv SSSR,” in Sovetskij Ekran, 
no. 8 (Feb. 18, 1929): 14. “Obzor pechati,” in Sovetskij Ekran, no. 30 (July 
30, 1929): 9.
88  “Kino i oborona,” in Kino i zhizn´, no. 16 (June 1, 1930): 7.
89  M. Sychev, “Kino na sluzhbe oborony SSSR,” in Sovetskij Ekran, no. 
30 (July 30, 1929): 5.
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conflict, cinema was called upon not to copy Western pacifism 
or neutralize the German-Soviet antagonism on behalf a pro-
letarian solidarity, as Boris Barnet for Okraina was criticized.90 
Even more abrasively attacked than Barnet was the director of 
Sniper, Semëon Timoshenko, whom M. Korol´ in the journal 
Proletarskoe kino accused of having totally ignored whether his 
interpretation of the war was compatible with Lenin’s doctrine 
in regard to warfare.  Korol’s comments on Timoshenko and his 
work were crushing. He argued that Timoshenko´s mindset in 
fact had nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism and its attitude 
towards questions of peace and war. Sniper, he alleged, was an 
example of Western “Remarquism,” completely neglecting the 
importance of class conflicts.91 Lewis Milestone’s film adapta-
tion of All Quiet on the Western Front was not shown “publicly” 
in the Soviet Union,92 but in a hypertrophic manner the movie 
served as example of Western mendaciousness in regard to 
pacifistic films. The Soviet people had to be indoctrinated that 
the only country that really wanted peace was, of course, the 
Soviet Union. 
Various factors are responsible for the marginalization and, final-
ly, the disappearance of World War I-related films from the Soviet 
screen in the 1930s. Karen Petrone in this connection refers to 
“many bureaucratic and ideological forces and economic constraints 
within the Soviet Union pushing against continued emphasis on 
90  Youngblood, “A War Forgotten,” 185; “Fi´lma i oborona,” in Proletar-
skoe kino, no. 13 (October 1932): 3–5; V. Plonskij, “Zadachi teoreticheskoi 
raboty po voenno-oboronnoj fil´me,” in Proletarskoe kino, no. 11 (Septem-
ber 1932): 28–31. 
91  Korol´, “Voennokhudozhestvennaia kinoprodukciia,” 36.
92  Karen Petrone, The Great War in Russian Memory, 230.
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World War I.”93 Propagandistic efforts to make Soviet people aware 
of future conflicts have to be taken into account in particular. World 
War One obviously was not suited for creating an unconditional 
readiness for war among Soviet people. The “imperialistic” conflict 
of the past could not give positive example of patriotic duty as it was 
required by the communist fatherland in the 1930s. When Soviet cin-
ema made the transition to sound in this period, encapsulating and 
cutting off from the Western cinema, it was instructed to abandon 
the avant-garde practices of the 1920s and to accept the guidelines of 
socialist realism. Cinema had to create positive heroes and obedient 
citizens to support the course of the Communist Party and to defend 
the motherland against invaders. The most famous example of films 
that had to convey an optimistic type of patriotism was E. Dzigan’s 
Esli zaftra voina (If War Comes Tomorrow), released in 1938.94  
93  Ibid., 291. See also: Jamie Miller, “The Purges of Soviet Cinema, 
1929–38,” Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema 1, no. 1 (2006): 5–26, ac-
cessed April 1, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/srsc.1.1.5_1. On the per-
ception of the First World War without a special hint at Soviet cinema 
between 1941 and 1945: “Space for history opened wider during World 
War II as the country mobilized to fight a people’s war. The First World 
Imperialist War suddenly became World War I, the enemy was no longer 
international imperialism but German imperialism, and commemorative 
articles outlined the communalities between past German behavior and 
Nazi expansionism”; Cohen, “Oh, That!,” 83.
94  Jamie Miller, Soviet Cinema, 16–19; A.V. Fediuk, “Sovetskaia sistema 
kinemtografa 1930gg.: Rol´ chudozhestvennogo kino v agitacionno-propa-
gandistskoi rabote Stalinskogo rezhima,” in Problemy rossijskoj istorii, Vy-
pusk 10 (Moscow: Magnitogorsk,  2010), 294–311, here: 294–296;  S.V. Do-
brashenko, Russkii sovetskii chudozhestvennyi fil´m v 1930–1934 godach (na 
materiale zvukogo kino), Avtoreferat dissertatsii, predstavlennoi na soiskanie 
uhenoi stepeni kandidata iskusstvovedceskikh nauk (Moscow 1952), 5.
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1945–2014
 “The cataclysm of World War II forever changed the meaning and 
also the name of World War I in the Soviet Union as in the rest of 
Europe. In the last years of Stalin´s reign, the overwhelming task 
of rebuilding the country despite the loss of perhaps as many as 
twenty-seven million people overwhelming eclipsed the remem-
brance of World War I.”95 In fact, after 1945, attention to World 
War One was only sporadic. Soviet cinema was not an exception. 
As Alexandre Sumpf shows, only very few films, for instance, 
Agoniia (Agony, 1975, directed by Elem Klimov), referred to the 
Great War but did not put it in the center of interest.96 In addition, 
A.M. Belogor´ev quotes the TV drama Zhizn´ Klima Samgina 
(Life of Klim Samgin), a 1986 adaption of Maksim Gor´kii´s novel, 
Bumbarash (1971), told along with one of Arkadii Gaidar’s early lit-
erary works;  or Skorbnoe beschuvstvo (Mournful Unconsciousness, 
1986, directed by Aleksandr Sukorov), a high-grade experimental 
adaption of George Bernard Shaw’s play Heartbreak House, which 
because of its intransigence of (non-)narration probably met with 
no response among a broader audience. Besides, in 1987, Aleksandr 
Muratov adapted for screen a novel by Valentin Pikul´. According 
to Belogore´ev, Moonzund is the only film in the period between 
1945 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union that really focused 
on the First World War, by showing the situation of the Russian 
navy at the Baltic Sea. Furthermore, Belogor´ev points to the film 
adaptations of Mikhail Sholokhov’s Tikhii Don (And Quiet Flows 
the Don, 1957–1958 by Sergei Gerasimov and 1986–1992 by Sergei 
Bondarchuk) and Aleksei Tolstoi’s Khozhdeniia po mukam (Life 
of suffering, 1957–1959 by Grigorii Roshalem and 1977 by Vasilii 
95  Karen Petrone, The Great War, 282.
96  Alexandre Sumpf, La Grande Guerre oubliée: Russie, 1914–1918 (Par-
is: Perrin, 2014), 457.
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Ordynskii). In these films—rarely enough—Austrian soldiers and 
officers appear. The concept of the enemy however differs very 
much. In both adaptations of Tichii Don, the Austrian soldier who 
is killed by one of the central characters is more or less a victim 
of the circumstances,97 whereas in Roshalem’s version of Tolstoy’s 
novel the Austrians are characterized as tormentors of Russian 
prisoners of war.98
In the 1990s, Russian cinema turned to various themes and start-
ed to rethink also the Soviet past. Nikita Mikhalkov’s Utomlënnye 
solntsem (Burnt by the Sun, 1994), for instance, depicted the fate of 
a senior Red Army officer and his family during the “Great Purges,” 
and The Thief (1997, directed by Pavel Chukhrai) showed a young 
mother and her son’s everyday struggle for survival in the late 1940s 
through the early 1950s.  Finally, Russian cinema and TV discov-
ered history before Russia had become communist. In doing so, 
Russian films followed the official course of a gradual rehabilitation 
of the Tsarist Empire, as well as its sovereigns and “servants”—if 
only so they could be introduced as patriots. Putin had “recognized 
the enormous potential of cinema” and, of course, also of TV “for 
nation building purposes”99 and for his patriotic campaign. As a 
result, history before the Bolshevik Revolution was integrated in a 
“patriotic re-interpretation” of Russian history as a whole. 
97  Already in 1931, Olga Preobrazhenskaia had been criticized to blur 
the characters of the Austrian officer and Grigorii as well as of the Cosacks 
in general in her film Tichii Don (1931); See: J. Iukov, “Tichii Don,” Prole-
tarskoe kino, no. 10 (November 1931): 16–21. 
98  A. M. Belogor´ev, “Pervaia mirovaia voina,” 148–149.
99  Jasmijn Van Gorp, “National Identity in Post 9/11 Transnational Cin-
ema: The Case of the Russian Blockbuster 9th Company,” in Postcommunist 
Film - Russia, Eastern Europe and World Culture: Moving Images of Postcom-
munism, ed. Lars Kristensen (London: Routledge, 2012), 13–23, here: 15. 
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A lot of persons engaged in the cultural sector did and do 
support Putin’s course. Nikita Mikhalkov, as one of Russia’s lead 
filmmakers, contributed to the new approach to Russia’s past, too. 
In his work, he addressed Russia in the turbulent period between 
the 1870s and 1930s. His “love of the military as a key producer 
of collective subjectivity” is manifested, for example, in Sibirskiy 
Tsiriul´nik (The Barber of Siberia, 1998), dedicated to “Russian 
officers, the pride of the Fatherland.”100 The positive image of 
Tsarist officers replaced their damnation in the Soviet era. The 
restoration of Tsarist army’s reputation was no longer taboo. 
In 2005, Russian TV produced Gibel´ imperii (The Fall of the 
Empire), a television series with 10 episodes, depicting the strug-
gle of Tsarist military intelligence in the First World War and the 
role of intelligence officers after the caesura of 1917. German an-
tagonists and, in very rare cases, Austrian spies and traitors figure 
only on the very margins of six episodes. The main characters, 
Russian intelligence officers and their families, are patriotic he-
roes and, finally, victims of unpatriotic evil, criminal revolution-
aries and brutalized soldiers. Gibel´ imperii brings a rehabilitation 
of Tsarist officers, insinuating that former social order was not 
that false: Officers do know what has to be done, soldiers don’t, 
and beautiful middle -class women are morally and intellectually 
superior to superstitious and featherbrained house maids. The 
audience is confronted with a stirring drama of Russia’s down-
fall and a tragic struggle of super-patriots to protect their home 
country from alien invaders and then, in 1917, from traitors to 
their own country. Andrei Kravchuk in the Admiral (2008) gives a 
similar interpretation of the war by presenting Admiral Kolchak as 
a superhero. The costly action film on Kolchak’s fate made it quite 
100  Nancy Condee, The Imperial Trace: Recent Russian Cinema (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 91–92.
280 habsburg’s last war: the filmic memory (1918 to the present)
plain that the “white Admiral” was a real patriot who served Russia 
until his death.101 
Batal´on´´. Pervii Zhenskii. Bessmertnyi (Battalion, 2014, direct-
ed by Dmitrii Meshkiev), however, is the most impressive example 
of the Russia’s recent interpretation of World War One. The film, 
produced by Fëdor Bondarchuk, was supported by official Russian 
authorities, including the Russian Military Historical Society. The 
latter had been reconstituted in 2012 by the President of Russia, 
“with the goal of consolidating the resources of the State and the 
Society for the study of Russia’s Military-Historical past, facilitating 
the study of national military history and counteracting attempts to 
distort it, as well as to popularize the achievements of military-his-
torical study, encourage patriotism, and raise the prestige of mil-
itary service.”102According to this characterization by the Society 
itself, the film obviously had to correspond with the aims cited. Its 
Chairman, the ministry of culture, Vladimir Medinskii, on the oc-
casion of the production of Battalion, said that WWI “has always 
been badmouthed.” “We hope,” he added, that the film “will restore 
some honor in the minds of the people about their motherland.”103
The story of Battalion is based on real events during WWI. It de-
picts the establishment of a battalion of female soldiers in the era of 
the Provisional Government by Maria Bochkareva. Facing chaotic 
101  See: Karen Petrone, “´Now Russia returns its history to itself´: Rus-
sia Celebrates the Centenary of the First World War,” in Remembering 
the First World War, ed. Bart Ziino (London: Routledge, 2015), 207–222, 
129–145, and 139.
102  Official site of the “Russian Military-Historical Society,” accessed 
Feb. 7, 2016, http://histrf.ru/ru/rvio/rvio/English.
103  “Why is Russia Commemorating WWI With a Propaganda Film?”, 
accessed Feb. 7, 2016, http://www.indiewire.com/article/why-is-rus-
sia-commemorating-wwi-with-a-propaganda-film-20140730.
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demobilization and the breakdown of the Western front, Bochkareva 
aimed to “save the motherland,” left alone in its struggle for survival 
by soldiers “blinded by notions of false freedom.”104 Members of the 
military and administration in 1917 “were enthusiastic about the idea 
of a unit consisting of women, believing that female soldiers would 
have powerful propaganda value. They thought it would revitalize the 
downtrodden and fatigued male soldiers, shaming them into resum-
ing combat duties.”105 In fact, the battalion’s impact on Russian warfare 
between February and October Revolutions was marginal. Still, the 
message of the film is obvious: To protect one’s motherland is a “sacred 
duty,” notwithstanding the prospects of success. Interestingly, most of 
the men shown on the screen, irrespective of whether they are Russian 
or German, are either cruel or primitive or cowardly and depraved. 
So, one can reason, the ideal “creature” of current Russian patriotic 
self-concept is half man half woman, and above all loyal.106 Putin’s 
104  M. Norris, “Dmitrii Meskhiev: Battalion (Batal’on, 2015),” kinokul-
tura.com, accessed Feb. 6, 2016, http://www.kinokultura.com/2016/51r-
batalion.shtml.
105  “Why is Russia Commemorating WWI With a Propaganda Film”, 
accessed Feb. 7, 2016.
106  “Russia’s women soldiers are repeatedly shown to be patriotic, they 
are willing to defend their motherland, they have the proper hatred for Rus-
sia’s enemies, and they have the Orthodox faith. The male imperial officer 
class is divided, but ultimately patriotic too, particularly when several offi-
cers disobey the Soviet Military Committees by tearing off their epaulettes 
and joining the women. The Provisional Government, Kerensky in partic-
ular, is largely shown to be ineffective but relatively benign. The villains are 
the nasty German soldiers who employ chemical weapons and subterfuge 
and also, most significantly, the brutish, dirty, defeatist Russian soldiers who 
no longer want to fight. In the end, though, they too are redeemed some-
what by the patriotism of the Women’s Battalion”; M. Norris, “Battalion.”
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various statements on his understanding of patriotism, “as well 
as the patriotic education program documents, make clear that 
among the major indicators of loyalty to the state are military 
service and a pledge to defend the state.”107 
In Kino-Kultura, Stephen M. Norris wrote very critically 
about Battalion, which had disposed a budget of about ten 
million dollars. He highlighted the propagandistic mission of 
the production and the use of history as a, in fact, replaceable 
setting without any expedient information for the audience: 
“Meshkiev’s Battalion does not delve into anything that might 
offer nuance or detract from its overall patriotic mythistory. 
We do not learn much about the Great War, why and where 
the Women’s Battalion fought, or much about Bochkareva’s 
backstory.”108 So, it could not be a surprise that, once more, 
it was not of much importance for the filmmakers who 
fought against whom and for what reason. Nevertheless, the 
Germans are brutal and act perfidiously. It becomes evident 
that differences between the depiction of Germans in World 
War One and Germans in World War Two in Russian cinema 
dissolve. Austria-Hungary, however, is not even mentioned in 
Battalion.      
As Stephen M. Norris, referring to Larisa Maliukova´s review 
in the Novaia gazeta, concludes: The film “uses the past to bang 
out a message to contemporary audiences. Battalion is not a 
movie to watch if you want to ‘see history’ and learn anything 
about the Women’s Battalion of Death in 1917. It is a movie to 
107  Valerie Sperling, “Making the Public Patriotic: Militarism and An-
ti-militarism in Russia,” in Russian Nationalism and the National Reasser-
tion of Russia, ed. Marléne Laruelle (London: Routledge, 2010), 218–276, 
here: 258.
108  Norris, “Battalion.”
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watch if you want to see how contemporary patriotism gets artic-
ulated and mapped onto the past.”109
To restore the Tsarist army’s honor, and to show that there is 
reason for Russian people to be proud of its performance until the 
uprising of October 1917, was also a goal of various documentary 
films that were released on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of 
the outbreak of the Great War.  
Of course, these films do not get along without explaining the 
role of Austria-Hungary, especially in regard to the outbreak of 
the conflict. But, generally, the Habsburg state remains a dim 
something. Its army enters the scene only for some select mo-
ments. While, for instance, several Germany’s military leaders 
are introduced by characterizing them as able, but also terrifying 
adversaries (for instance General August von Mackensen), the 
Austrian Chief of the General Staff General Franz Conrad von 
Hötzendorf is not even mentioned. Sporadically, soldiers of the 
Habsburg forces appear as POWs. The “great retreat” of Russian 
troops in 1915 as a result of German-Austrian offensive appears 
as “national tragedy.”110 All the more, in those episodes of the 
production Istorija Rossija XX veka that are dedicated to the First 
World War, the filmmakers are above all interested in showing 
how bravely the Russians fought. The patriotic officers of the 
Tsarist army are cast as victims of unpatriotic revolutionaries. 
Russia’s enemies were predominant only because of their tech-
nological and economic superiority, not in terms of the fighting 
spirit and the bravery of officers and soldiers as well. Western 
states, whether they were allies or enemies, appear as more or 
less morally rotten players. France and Great Britain succeed 
109  Ibid.
110  Rossiia XX Vek. Pervaia Mirovaia Voina (Chasti 1 I 2); Pervaia 
Mirovaia Voina. 1914–1918 (2 DVD); Istoriia Rossii XX veka, fil´my 1–28.
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because of Russian soldiers’ sacrifice.111 The Germans had ruth-
lessly attacked the Tsarist Empire, and the Danube monarchy 
is accused for having deported thousands of “Russians” (i.e., 
Ruthenen or Ukrainians) in various “death camps”—war crimes 
that were hushed by Western Europe until today. Actually, on 
the eve of World War I, the Austrian authorities had begun a 
wave of persecution against the Russophiles in Galicia. Hundreds 
were arrested and brought to camps in Austria. In the Thalerhof 
camp, approximately 2,000 internees died, most of them as a con-
sequence of epidemics and horrendous living conditions. Only 
in recent years was the internment of so called “Russophiles” 
examined by Austrian historians.112 The death toll among in-
ternees, refugees, and POWs in Austria-Hungary was immense. 
The reasons are complex. The makers of the above-mentioned 
documentary film on World War One, however, were not in-
terested in a balanced and differentiated analysis. They imply a 
conjunction of the fate of “Russian” people during World War 
One and Nazi mass murders. Furthermore, the audience learns 
that the “Ukrainian people” was a propagandistic invention 
111  This interpretation was widespread already during the war. Even 
Austro-Hungarian secret service officers reported on this topic and 
stressed the impression that Russia blamed its allies for defeat and the 
high number of dead soldiers among Russian troops; see: Albert Pethö, 
Agenten für den Doppeladler: Österreich-Ungarns Geheimer Dienst im 
Weltkrieg (Graz: Leopold Stocker Verlag, 1998), 79.
112  Hannes Leidinger et al., Habsburgs Schmutziger Krieg: Ermittlungen 
zur österreichisch-ungarischen Kriegsführung 1914–1918 (St. Pölten: Res-
idenz Verlag, 2014); Georg Hoffmann, Nicole-Melanie Goll, and Philipp 
Lesiak, Thalerhof 1914–1936: Die Geschichte eines vergessenen Lagers und 
seiner Opfer (Herne: Schäfer, 2010).
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of Russia’s enemies,113 and that there is only a minor difference 
between the crimes of Nazi Germany in the Second World War 
and the oppression Russians (not Ukrainians!) suffered in the 
First World War. The production, which was financially support-
ed by Russian Orthodox Church, intends to unmask a Western 
Europe that is only ironically called “civilized.” The anti-Western 
and anti-Semitic tenor is unmistakable. Experts of the “Russian 
Institute for Strategic Studies,” established by the President of the 
Russian Federation, present a narrative of World War One that 
outlines why present-day Russia must be aware of—that is the 
message—Western Europe’s presumptuousness and contempt of 
Russian people. One can read this interpretation of Russia’s role 
in the First World War as advising self-isolation and retreat to a 
“better,” namely a “Russian,” world.
In general, the remembrance of the First World War in recent 
Russian feature and documentary films114 exhibits “aspects of 
émigré military commemorative practice,” namely “the prom-
inence of religion and the Orthodox Church,” the “valorization” 
of the imperial army115 and a certain nostalgia for the Romanov 
monarchy. This combination, however, is complemented by a 
mixture of Soviet paradigms and recent re-interpretations. The 
emphasis on Soviet-German antagonism and the alienation from 
the former allies, followed by a complete discord among the 
113  Putin shares this statement. On occasion of the war in the Ukraine 
he said: “I consider Russians and Ukrainians generally to be one people”; 
see “Russian Orthodox Church Lends Weight to Putin Patriotism,” BBC, 
accessed Feb. 8, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33982267.
114  A special approach to WWI was chosen by the makers of the doc-
umentary film Do voiny ja byl malen´kim (Before the War I Was Young), 
produced in 2006 on Russian child soldiers during World War One.
115  Cohen, “Oh, That!,” 85.
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former partners, undoubtedly are perseverative narratives. Today, 
World War I is not a “war forgotten” in Russia, but a war “trans-
formed”: defeat has been turned into victory. The current official 
Russian notion that “victory is tied very closely to an emerging” or 
already emerged and prevailing “view of the war as a heroic one in 
which Russian soldiers fought valiantly and demonstrated ‘mass 
heroism’. This stands in contrast both to long-standing Western 
notions that the Russian soldier fought poorly in the First World 
War and Soviet claims that after a very brief period of chauvinistic 
fervour, the Russian soldier refused to fight.”116 Russian fictional 
and documentary films have processed these notions and generat-
ed representations of war as tools for a patriotic re-interpretation 
of the Tsarist Empire’s last war. Lacking a plausible utility in terms 
of being relevant for present Russia’s politics, the “deceased Dual 
Monarchy” in this conception can easily be neglected or even 
forgotten.  
116  Petrone, “´Now Russia Returns Its History to Itself,” 134.
